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Abstract 
Organizational modes of industrial house project are studied by economic analysis method in view of transaction 
costs analysis. By analyzing condition of dynamic alliance, some necessary conditions about self-support, out-
sourcing, dynamic alliance modes are obtained, cost and benefit of three modes is analyzed, and furthermore some 
advices on industrial house project are obtained. 
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1. Introduction 
Group Ltd. is the most common form in housing industrialization projects management. It is carried 
out mainly by self-support mode and out-sourcing. With the expansion of the scale of the group, self-
support tendency keeps growing. But its drawback is becoming obvious [1, 2]. For all the above, a new 
organization form--dynamic alliance, attracts more attention. And now the problem is when will be the 
good time for dynamic alliance formation, it is very important and must be decided before the project 
carried out. 
Generally, there are three form choices, self-support, out-sourcing and dynamic alliance according to 
the participators [3-5]. (1) Self-support form is the project is carried out by own techniques and resources, 
they design, construct and manage by themselves and only purchase some machines and raw materials 
outside.(2) Out-sourcing form is that the project’s sponsors outsource the design, construction and 
management to some professional firms or institutions (contractors) to carry out the project.(3) The 
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dynamic alliance form is that the project’s sponsors (clients) select one or more professional firms or 
institutions (partners) to carry out the specific works and collaborate with them on the implementation 
and management. The general form is forming corporation teams carry out the project implementation, 
sponsors focus on strategy development, overall management and decision-making and operational 
aspects of the work; the project partners focus on specific technical realization, the daily management and 
control.  
In this paper, we discussed the applicability of the three organizations in different environment by 
using cost model, and gave some proposals by analysis. 
2. Transaction cost analysis of dynamic alliance choice.  
2.1.  Transaction cost and organization cost 
In the market economy, the internal allocation of resources still exist in enterprises, the main reason is 
the existence of transaction cost and "scale effect" in actual market exchange process. It prompts the 
enterprises or companies to make related activities for reduce transaction cost and obtain scale economies. 
But it creates management cost, control and supervision cost, therefore, the actual market economic 
activities often minimize total cost [6].
This paper defines the transaction cost as one of organization operation costs [7], the organization must 
pay for obtaining benefit through market transactions, related to various cost and expenses in the trading 
process. Meanwhile, to some extent, market transactions and internal management behavior can be 
alternative, both have corresponding operating cost determined by organizations’ characteristics, 
otherwise, the external environment also influences the both cost and as well as the total cost, and 
organization’s decision follows the principle of minimum total cost [8].
Therefore, we define transaction cost ( tC ) as the cost happened when the transaction occurred, such as 
cost of the investigation and searching for information, negotiation, decision-making cost and the cost of 
the implementation of policies. And define organization cost ( oC ) as the management cost due to the 
transactions internalization. 
2.2.  Cost-benefit analysis of the choice of organization form 
Previous researches measure the inputs of management resources in transactions in the form of money 
by analyzing the relationships between inputs and benefit in market transactions and internal management 
aspects[9,10], these inputs is transaction cost. And we use money to measure the increased outputs caused 
by the increased inputs of the resources on the transaction management aspect, which named as 
transaction management outputs ( tQ ); the corresponding organization cost is "organization Management 
outputs" ( oQ ). Management outputs not only deduce cost, but also generate benefit. Transaction benefit 
( tB ) is defined as the part an organization's revenues exceeded all cost of production, sales and control 
(but excluding transaction cost); similarly, organizational benefit ( oB ) is the part an organization’s 
income exceeded all production, sales, cost control (but not including the organization cost). Suppose 
)( ttt QcC = 、 )( ooo QcC = ， )( ttt QbB = 、 )( ooo QbB = ， tC 、 oC 、 tB 、 oB are increasing 
functions，so 0)( >′ tt Qc 、 0)( >′ oo Qc ， 0)( >′ tt Qb 、 0)( >′ oo Qb ，but 0)( >′′ tt Qc 、 0)( >′′ oo Qc ，
0)( <′′ tt Qb 、 0)( <′′ oo Qb ，see Fig. 1. 
Figure 1 shows only one relation of transaction cost, benefit, and organization’s cost and benefit. In 
fact, the four curves may have various relations for a given management outputs (or inputs of the 
management resources identified under the premise), we have to compare the following functions: 
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Whether the improvement of the benefit due to the internal activities is greater than the resulting cost 
increase, or the "profits" caused by the internal activities is greater than the "profit" caused by the market 
activities (that is, transaction cost-benefit difference), if function (1) is greater than zero, then the 
organization should internalized the activity (it means the organization should internalize the operations 
to provide products or services); and else, the organization should take market-oriented activities. 
Fig. 1 Cost and benefit of the management outputs 
The total management profit is  
( ) ( ))()()()()()( oooottttoott ACABACABAA −+−=+= πππ                      (2) 
So we convert the activity of seeking to maximize profits into following planning issues:  
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The existence condition of the extreme value is:
toto MCMCMBMB ===                                                       (4) 
That is the marginal management profits and marginal management cost.  
If the current market transaction cost is relatively low (for example with relatively low cost of 
searching because of the relatively large number of participants, and a lower negotiating cost because that 
more competitors, participants in the negotiating process, they are more likely to make concessions). The 
sponsor’s profits from transaction management will become more. They will prefer to increase 
management outputs in market transactions (outsourcing more projects).But when more sponsors 
providing more outsourcing projects, the participator’s position improved ( for increasing demand), and 
became more capable in negotiation. This means the transaction cost curve is upward (that means the 
same outputs but more production management cost), there is lower profits of transaction under the same 
management output. On one hand, some sponsors will upward transaction benefit curve to offset the 
transaction cost curve shift by improving transaction management capabilities (such as strengthening 
purchasing management, training or employing more outstanding negotiators, etc.); On the other hand, 
some sponsors management capabilities will not be further improved, the transaction cost upward curve 
has no intersection with transaction benefit curve (transaction cost will always be more than transaction 
benefit), the sponsors will abandon out-sourcing this part (that means this part will be traded in market), 
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the decrease in the number of sponsors also will weaken participants in the market, resulting transaction 
cost curve downward. 
We can make a similar analysis on the organization cost and benefit curves. The organization would 
prefer a self-support mode under a lower organization cost. The organization cost curves are likely to shift 
upward when the projects in self-support mode increase, more technical difficulty and complexity of the 
project and the rising salary of the staff caused by increased capacity. And part of this project will be 
implemented through outsourcing, the organization cost curve decrease. Of course, organizations can 
improve internal technological level and management level, reduce the high pressure of increasing pay 
level by a variety of incentive way to enhance its internal organizational process management capabilities, 
enabling organizations benefit curve upward. At the same time, transaction cost and the organization cost 
will also influence each other. When the transaction cost curve is upward, more organizations will carry 
out operations through internal activities, and more internal activities will lead the organization cost curve 
upward. 
Fig.2 Equilibrium between market transaction and organization internal management 
The dynamic process will come to an equilibrium, the transaction cost curve is tangential to the 
transaction benefit curve, the organization cost and benefit curves, see Fig.2 (a). We assume that 
transaction cost and benefit are higher than organization cost and benefit. Some times the equilibrium 
between market transaction management and organization internal management will happen, see Fig. 2(b) 
in detail (At this time transaction cost curve overlaps organizational cost one, transaction benefit curve 
overlaps the curve of organization). 
3. The conditions for housing industry dynamic alliance formation 
3.1 Dynamic alliance——cooperation relationship forming 
In the above, we discussed self-support and out-sourcing modes. Now we discuss the possibility of 
dynamic alliance mode (sponsors and participants in the formation of a cooperative relationship). 
We assume that under certain conditions, the transaction cost curve has not intersection with the 
transaction benefit curve, the organization cost or benefit curves. Under these conditions there are two 
possibilities: the organization cost curve intersects with the transaction benefit curve (see Fig.3a); or 
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transaction cost and organizational benefit curve have intersection (see Fig.3b). The two situations are 
discussed as followed. 
(1) Organization cost curve intersect to transaction benefit curve  
At this time, the out-sourcing maybe better (obtain more profits) than self-support. The cause maybe 
lack of related professionals in the organization, no relevant experience in the field and required 
professional skills. The project commissioned to some professionals is better than relying on their own 
efforts. At the same time, outsourcing transaction cost is higher than that of self-support. On the other 
hand, the cost is higher than benefit whether in out-sourcing or self-support, but the transaction benefit is 
likely higher than the organization cost. 
Fig.3 Conditions of dynamic alliance formation  
In such circumstances, it’s a good idea for sponsors to establish a project management dynamic 
alliance. They can obtain more revenue from trading and reduce transaction cost. The major outsourcing 
transaction cost including four parts: searching cost, negotiation cost, commissioned - acting related 
control cost and the communication cost when explaining the involved business processes. 
In dynamic alliance mode, the searching cost and the negotiation cost is inevitable (which is the 
payment to gain market transactions benefit). The control cost may decline for the league comprised with 
two staff members and sponsors understand the details of project implementation. Staffs are ready to 
explain related operational issues to the participants who work together with them, and promptly convey 
the views, which to some extent reduce the cost of communication of information. Transaction cost curve 
will be lower. When transaction cost curve near to organization cost curve, sponsors will benefit from 
transaction and lower transaction cost simultaneously. 
(2) Transaction cost curve intersect to organization benefit curve  
In the scenario, it will obtain more profits through the self-support than out-sourcing. For example, the 
project has a very close business relationship with the project sponsors, the sponsors fully control the 
implementation process; or it may be the sponsors, their own operational and strategic understanding is 
far more familiar with the project, the project carried out by the sponsors than by some professional 
institutes or firms.  
In such circumstances, the project sponsors can adopt a special dynamic alliance- multi-organization 
contrite to carry out the project, to get organization benefit and at the same time reduce the raising cost of 
inter organization in the implementation of the project. The internal institutions or provisional project 
team is responsible for specific project, but the implementation of the project required the project team 
B、C
(a)
Ct
Co
      Bt
         
Bo
Q
B、C
(b)
Co
Ct
      Bo
         
Bt
Q
684  Zhong-guo WANG et al. / Energy Procedia 16 (2012) 679 – 686 Author name / Energy Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
organized market resources (all participants) to complete. Thus, the project team managers are relative 
familiar on organizational strategy and business, and for he is a member of the organization, the 
organization’s controlling power of him (and thus the controlling power of the whole project) is strong; it 
reduced the possibility of the damage the project team to the sponsor by commission -acting relations. 
Thus supervision and information communication cost also decreased, making transaction cost curve 
lower; At the same time competition mechanism is used to select the internal body parts or personnel for 
the implementation of the project (such projects involve little technical expertise, low barriers to entry, a 
considerable number of qualified staff in internal organization can implement the project work), the 
resources of the project are through the market mechanism to configure and to take certain way in order 
to insure the project team to share the project proceeds (of course, share the risk of the project also). In 
the contract form, the project team is part of the organization with incentive effect brought by the 
introduction of a certain degree of market mechanism, the sponsors could reached the benefit of the 
organization while reducing the associated transaction cost. 
Tab. 1 Cost-benefit analysis of the three forms of project management 
 Organization benefit Organization cost Transaction benefit Transaction cost 
Self-support 
1. More complete 
  information 
2. High information  
Symmetry 
3. Convergence of profits 
4. Strong team stability  
5. Strong communication 
skills
6. Strengthening core  
competitiveness 
1.Difficult management 
Inefficient  
2. Not professional, 
  High cost of learning  
3. High coordination 
  cost  
4. Paid ratchet effect, 
  Low risk sharing 
O
ut-sourcing 
  1.Professional, scale 
  economic 
2. Higher quality or 
price value  
3. Clear responsibility 
4. High management 
  efficiency 
5. Cost easy control  
6. Avoidance of 
  decision’s liberty  
1. High searching 
  cost 
2. High negotiation 
 cost 
3.High-
communication 
cost
4. Reverse selection 
  and moral hazard 
5. High insuring cost 
D
ynam
ic alliance 
1. More complete information 
2. Lesser information 
asymmetry 
3. Sustainable  
4. Human capital  
1. Profit conflict, 
management difficulties 
2. Furry responsibilities and 
obligations 
3. High communication cost 
4. Easy to create a sense of 
no trust and lower the 
morale of team  
1. More profitable to 
leagues
2. Higher quality/price 
value
3. Cost easy control 
4. Risk easy control 
1. Searching cost 
2. Negotiation cost 
3.2 Comparing transaction cost and organization cost in the three forms 
Comparing the transaction and organizational cost and benefit is the key step to make the choice of the 
three forms, self-support, out-sourcing and dynamic alliance. In this paper, the discussion was focused on 
the comparison of the main characteristics of the three forms of projects implementation. We 
hypothesized the market as fully competitive market and didn’t consider the related transaction cost and 
the management fees of purchasing the equipment and raw materials in self-support form. So we just 
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consider organizations cost and benefit in the self-support mode, while transaction efficiency and 
transaction cost is 0.  
In discussing out-sourcing, basically assumed that the project will be launched to implement by 
participants, so we can consider the management cost of the sponsors is non-existent, and focus on its 
transaction cost and transaction benefit. The management cost-benefit analysis was shown as table 1. 
4. The applicability of the three forms 
It’s impossible to judge absolutely which form should be taken in the practice of housing 
industrialization projects management, Self-support, Out-sourcing or dynamic alliance? But the project 
sponsors can take a relatively appropriate manner in accordance with some criteria based on above 
discussion.  
We can regard two aspects to assess the applicability of the three management modes. The project 
itself is the first feature-related considerations, including whether have high requirements for 
organizational strategy and operations of the  project sponsor, and  whether requires for professional 
knowledge and technology, whether the  involving information is sensitive information or its security 
requirements is very high to the project sponsor. And the project supervision and quality control, the 
project follow-up services after delivery process requirements, the change possibility of the plan or 
program in the course of the implementing process must be considered also. Second, the project sponsor 
related considerations, including whether the project sponsors hope to foster a group of technical or 
management personnel on the project and their delivery through the implementation of the project, 
whether the project sponsors have to control the implementation of the project strictly, the cohesion of the 
organization and the organizational culture (tendency to prefer centralized or decentralized management 
style) of the project sponsor. It should be emphasized that the various patterns have only relative 
significances, either option can not prevent management and coordination work in the process of the 
project, and the choice of an appropriate mode can reduce the difficulty of management and coordination 
of the work to some extent and reduce the corresponding cost, but the management work itself is always 
necessary. 
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